Course: 5-Day Healthcare Cybersecurity Boot Camp, Medical Device Security
5-Day Intensive Prep Healthcare Cybersecurity Boot Camp
Transitioning from SOC to Medical Device Security
🚀 Course Overview
A 5-day intensive program designed to help junior SOC analysts transition into medical device and healthcare cybersecurity roles. Gain hands-on experience with healthcare-specific security frameworks, threat modeling, and penetration testing techniques.
🎯 Key Learning Objectives
- Master healthcare security standards: ISO 81001, FDA guidance, NHS CyberEssentials
- Develop threat modeling skills: STRIDE analysis for medical devices
- Execute medical device pentesting: DICOM security testing, FHIR API security
- Implement secure SDLC: SAST/DAST, SBOM management, vulnerability patching
- Communicate security risks: Tailor messages for executives, regulators, and developers
🧑💻 Who Should Attend?
- SOC analysts targeting healthcare cybersecurity roles
- Junior security professionals interested in medical device security
- Candidates preparing for security interviews in regulated industries
🏆 Program Outcomes
By completing this boot camp, participants will:
✔ Understand healthcare-specific security requirements
✔ Be able to conduct medical device security assessments
✔ Have practical experience with healthcare security tools
✔ Be prepared for junior analyst roles in medical device security
Duration: 5 days | Level: Intermediate | Format: Hands-on labs, case studies, interview prep |
Day 1: Medical Device Security Foundations
Regulatory Standards Comparison
Control Area | ISO 81001 Requirements | NHS CyberEssentials | FDA Guidance | Radiotherapy Implementation |
---|---|---|---|---|
Access Control | 5.3.1: Role-based access for clinical functions | Control 4: User privilege management | Section IV.B: Authentication for treatment changes | DICOM AE Title whitelisting + Active Directory integration |
Cryptography | 5.3.2: TLS 1.2+ for network communications | Control 2: Secure configuration | Section VI.C: Encryption of PHI in transit | DICOM TLS with AES-256 and certificate-based authentication |
Audit Logging | 5.3.4: Log all treatment plan modifications | Control 3: Malware protection | Section V.D: Detect unauthorized changes | Syslog integration with SIEM for treatment plan changes |
Implementation Examples for Radiotherapy Systems:
- DICOM Security: Configure Orthanc server with TLS 1.3 using DICOM Supplement 142 Basic TLS Profile.
- User Access: Implement CyberEssentials Control 4 by integrating Mosaiq with Okta for MFA.
- Patch Management: Automated Windows updates for treatment planning workstations per FDA Section VII.
Healthcare Standards & Architecture
DICOM Security (Supplement 142)
Profile | Security Requirements | TLS Configuration |
---|---|---|
Basic TLS | Mandatory: Server authentication Optional: Client authentication |
TLS 1.2+ with AES-128 Certificate chain validation |
Enhanced TLS | Mandatory: Mutual authentication Secure cipher suites |
TLS 1.3 preferred ECDHE key exchange OCSP stapling |
SMART on FHIR Security Framework
Component | Requirement | Implementation |
---|---|---|
OAuth 2.0 | Authorization Code Flow with PKCE | Azure AD or Okta integration |
Scopes | Least privilege access | patient/*.read for viewing only |
2020 Elekta Vulnerabilities Case Study
CVE | Vulnerability | Impact | Mitigation |
---|---|---|---|
CVE-2020-6975 | Hard-coded credentials in MOSAIQ | Unauthorized access to patient data | Credential rotation + HSM integration |
CVE-2020-6977 | DICOM service DOS | Treatment delays | Rate limiting + AE title validation |
Threat Modeling Practice
STRIDE Analysis for Radiotherapy System
Component | Spoofing | Tampering | Repudiation | Information Disclosure | DOS | Elevation of Privilege |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
DICOM Node | Fake AE titles | Modified treatment plans | No logs of changes | Unencrypted PHI | Flood C-STORE | Admin via DIMSE |
Web Interface | Session hijacking | SQL injection | - | IDOR | Brute force login | XSS to admin |
Mini Security Risk Management Report
Risk | Severity | Mitigation | Standard Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Unauthorized treatment plan modification | Critical (CVSS 9.1) | Digital signatures with HSM | ISO 81001 5.3.3 |
DICOM DOS attack | High (CVSS 7.5) | Rate limiting + AE title validation | NHS CE Control 1 |
PHI leakage via FHIR | Medium (CVSS 5.3) | OAuth scopes + audit logging | FDA Section IV |
Day 2: Secure SDLC & Technical Documentation
Security Documentation Practice
Medical Device Documentation Requirements
Document | Standard | Template Structure | Example Content |
---|---|---|---|
Vulnerability Management SOP | FDA Postmarket |
|
"Critical CVEs patched within 7 days per NHS CE" |
SBOM | OWASP CycloneDX |
|
"pydicom 2.3.0 (CVE-2022-2534)" |
SOUP Management | IEC 62304 |
|
"OpenSSL: Critical, used for DICOM TLS" |
Security Risk Management Report Template
1. Executive Summary
- System: Cloud-connected radiotherapy planning
- Scope: DICOM, FHIR, and treatment plan storage
2. Risk Assessment Methodology
- Standards: ISO 14971, ISO 81001
- Tools: Threat Dragon, Microsoft TMT
-
Identified Risks
Risk ID Description Severity Mitigation R-001 Unauthorized plan modify Critical HSM signatures - Residual Risk Evaluation
- Justification for acceptable risks
- Appendices
- STRIDE diagrams
- Testing results
Security Testing Tools
SAST/DAST/SCA Command Reference
Tool | Command | Output Analysis | Medical Device Example |
---|---|---|---|
SonarQube | sonar-scanner -Dsonar.projectKey=RTPlan |
Check for hardcoded credentials in DICOM config | Verify AE titles aren't hardcoded |
OWASP ZAP | zap-cli quick-scan -s xss,sqli https://rtp-web |
Review FHIR API injection flaws | Test patientId parameter for IDOR |
Dependency-Check | dependency-check.sh --project RTPlan --scan /src |
Flag vulnerable DICOM libraries | Check pydicom for known CVEs |
Medical Device Code Review Findings
Vulnerability | Code Example | Fix | Standard Reference |
---|---|---|---|
DICOM injection | dcmsnd +P +sd "*.dcm" |
Validate AE titles | DICOM PS3.15 |
FHIR IDOR | /Patient/{id}/TreatmentPlan |
Add scope checks | SMART on FHIR |
Day 3: Penetration Testing & Vulnerability Management
Medical Device Testing Frameworks
Medical Device Penetration Testing (MD-PT)
Phase | Activities | Radiotherapy Focus | Tools |
---|---|---|---|
Planning | Define clinical impact scenarios | Treatment plan integrity | Threat Dragon |
Discovery | DICOM service enumeration | AE title brute force | dcmtk, nmap |
Exploitation | DICOM file injection | Malformed RT Plan objects | dcmodify, pydicom |
Radiotherapy System Test Cases
- DICOM Service DOS:
echoscu -aet HACKER -aec TARGET -n 1000 target-ip 104
- Treatment Plan Tampering:
dcmodify -i "(300a,00b0)=HACKED" plan.dcm
- FHIR API Abuse:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer token" /Patient/*/RTPlan
DICOM Security Testing with dcmtk
DICOM Security Test Commands
Test | Command | Expected Result | Security Control |
---|---|---|---|
TLS Verification | openssl s_client -connect ip:port -showcerts |
TLS 1.2+ with strong cipher | DICOM Suppl. 142 |
AE Title Validation | findscu -aet HACKER -aec TARGET -P -k 0008,0052="PATIENT" |
Reject unauthorized AE | NHS CE Control 4 |
DICOM File Validation | dcmftest malicious.dcm |
Reject malformed files | FDA Section VI |
Penetration Test Report Excerpt
Finding | Risk | Evidence | Recommendation |
---|---|---|---|
Unencrypted DICOM | High (CVSS 7.4) | Wireshark capture | Implement DICOM TLS per Suppl. 142 |
Day 4: Automation & Technical Leadership
Security Automation Examples
SBOM CVE Monitor (Python)
import requests
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
# Configuration
SBOM_FILE = "sbom.json"
SEVERITY = "CRITICAL"
NVD_API = "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/1.0"
def check_sbom_vulnerabilities():
# Parse SBOM (CycloneDX format)
with open(SBOM_FILE) as f:
sbom = json.load(f)
# Check components against NVD
for comp in sbom["components"]:
if "purl" in comp:
pkg = comp["purl"].split("@")[0]
res = requests.get(f"{NVD_API}?cpeMatchString={pkg}")
# Process vulnerabilities
for vuln in res.json().get("result", {}).get("CVE_Items", []):
if vuln["impact"]["baseMetricV2"]["severity"] == SEVERITY:
print(f"[!] Critical CVE found: {vuln['cve']['CVE_data_meta']['ID']}")
print(f" Affects: {comp['name']}@{comp['version']}")
print(f" Score: {vuln['impact']['baseMetricV2']['cvssV2']['baseScore']}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
check_sbom_vulnerabilities()
GitHub Actions Security Gates
Stage | Action | Medical Device Example |
---|---|---|
PR Check | - uses: shiftleft/scan-action@v1 |
Block PR if SAST finds DICOM hardcoding |
Build | - run: dependency-check --failOnCVSS 8 |
Fail build if critical CVE in SBOM |
Explain TLS requirements to different audiences:
- Regulatory Team: “Per ISO 81001 5.3.2 and FDA guidance, TLS 1.2+ is required to protect PHI in transit during DICOM transfers. Non-compliance could delay our 510(k) submission.”
- Executives: “Implementing TLS prevents $2M+ breach penalties under HIPAA while meeting NHS contract requirements, with minimal performance impact.”
- Developers: “Use OpenSSL 1.1.1+ with AES-256-GCM and certificate pinning in dcmtk configuration - here’s the code sample.”
Behavioral Question: “Describe implementing security in a regulated environment”
- Situation: “At [Company], our radiotherapy system needed FDA clearance with cybersecurity requirements.”
- Task: “I led the effort to implement ISO 81001 controls for the DICOM interface.”
- Action: “Deployed TLS 1.3 with mutual auth, threat modeled using STRIDE, and documented risk mitigations.”
- Result: “Achieved FDA clearance 3 weeks early with zero cybersecurity findings.”
Final Interview Checklist
Area | Key Points | Radformation Alignment |
---|---|---|
Standards | ISO 81001 5.3, NHS CE Controls 1/4, FDA Postmarket | Global compliance for cancer care products |
Technical | DICOM TLS, FHIR scopes, Treatment plan integrity | Directly relevant to their products |
Behavioral | STAR method with metrics | Show impact on patient safety |
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